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Abstract: Security of resource sharing and provenance is a major concern in wireless sensor networks (WSNs), where the
intruders can easily inject malicious intermediate nodes for various personal gains. This selective forwarding attack may
reduce the flow of resource sharing and throughput in the network. Most of the existing techniques are complex and do
not provide sufficient security to sensor nodes with low energy. This paper proposes an energy-efficient and lightweight
security protocol for optimal resource provenance in multihop WSNs and the Internet of things (IoT) network. The
sharing of the resources between the sensor nodes indicates the strength of the mutual cooperation between the nodes,
which will act as a link to generate a cooperative correlating coefficient in the proposed security protocol. The cooperative
correlating coefficient is computed and matched at the source and destination sensor node, which is broadcast to all the
connecting intermediate sensor nodes. A higher value of the cooperative correlating coefficient indicates stronger and
secure resource sharing between the sensor nodes with optimal resource provenance, and the lower value indicates the
possibility of the presence of adversarial sensor nodes between the hops. We calculate the energy dissipated for the
sensor nodes and the complete sensor network. The real-time cooperative correlating coefficient values are derived from
the cooperation of two USRPs. The simulation for the detection of adversarial sensor node and resource provenance
is done using MATLAB. The experimental result demonstrates secure resource provenance sharing in a sensor network
with high energy efficiency compared to the existing techniques.
Key words: Energy efficiency, Internet of things, provenance, resource sharing, security and privacy, wireless sensor
network

1. Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) emerged as one of the most powerful communication technologies of the 21st
century. WSNs and IoT have become an indispensable part of life with numerous connected devices at home
and work managing many vital tasks. Most of these connected devices like medical sensors and vehicular sensors
are designed for seamless interaction with good storage and computational capabilities [1–4]. IoT and WSNs
are currently deployed in applications in healthcare, home automation, military, and transportation [5–9]. The
major challenge with this rapid development and expansion of WSNs and IoT is in ensuring security and privacy.
As hundreds of sensors are connected to the network from various locations, it is vital to secure the sensitive
data transferred through the network as well as the data stored in the devices [10–13]. Unauthorized access
to the network and the devices can lead to serious consequences, especially in many healthcare and military
applications [14, 15]. In these networks, the data is collected by the sensor node and sent to the centralized
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server for processing and monitoring. Here, the data has to pass through a number of intermediate nodes in
the network located at various locations. These nodes collect, process, and make decision on resource sharing
in the network for efficient routing. All the nodes collect and pass provenance data for authentication in the
network.
Although many mechanisms are proposed to ensure secrecy of data in WSN, the security of provenance
is currently a major area of concern where the intruders can easily inject malicious intermediate nodes for
various personal gains [16, 17]. This selective forwarding attack may reduce the flow of resource sharing and
throughput. Most of the existing techniques are complex and do not provide sufficient security to sensor nodes
with low energy. A detailed investigation of secure provenance schemes and its associated security issues have
been presented in [17]. In [18], authors discuss a light-weight protocol for data provenance in IoT that uses
physical unclonable functions (PUFs). Data provenance schemes based on block chains have also been proposed
recently [19]. Various issues and challenges with data provenance in WSNs and IoT are also discussed in [20, 21].
In this paper, we propose a lightweight security protocol for optimal resource provenance in multihop
WSNs and IoT networks. The sharing of the resources between the sensor nodes indicates the strength of the
mutual cooperation between the nodes, which will act as a link to generate a cooperative correlating coefficient
(CCC) in the proposed security protocol. The CCC is computed and matched at the source and destination
sensor node, which is broadcast to all the connecting intermediate sensor nodes. A higher value of CCC indicates
stronger and secure resource sharing between the sensor nodes with optimal resource provenance, and the lower
value indicates the possibility of the presence of adversarial sensor nodes between the hops. We calculate the
energy dissipated for the sensor nodes and the complete sensor network. The real-time CCC values are derived
from the cooperation of two USRP, and the simulation for the detection of adversarial sensor node and resource
provenance is done using MATLAB 2018a. Results obtained highlight the better performance of the proposed
approach compared to previous techniques in secure resource provenance. The remaining section is organized
as follows. Section 2 discusses related works in the current research area. Section 3 discusses the proposed work
in detail. The system model used is discussed, along with theoretical analysis. Also, the algorithms used for
secure resource provenance is presented. The results and discussion are presented in Section 4, and the paper
concludes in Section 5. The list of frequently used notations is given in Table 1 and the list of abbreviations
used in the paper is given in Table 2.
Table 1. Frequently used notations.

Notation
Prec
Ptx
Gat
Gar
Lpth
D
λ
Prec(max)
Prec(min)
SKN 1
Ri , Rj

Definition
Received power by sensor node
Transmitted power by sensor node
Gain of transmitting antenna
Gain of receiving antenna
Path loss
Distance between the sensor nodes
Wave length
Max value of the received power
Min value of the received power
Secret key for SN1
Cooperation ratio for the ith sensor node

Table 2. List of abbreviations.

Abbreviation
UASN
USRP
IoT
PUF
PI
ToA
TP
RP
EVM
TRSS
SN1

Description
Underwater acoustic sensor networks
Universal software radio peripheral
Internet of things
Physical unclonable functions
Phaser information
Time of arrival
Transmit power
Receive power
Error vector magnitude
Transmit and received signal strength
Sensor node 1
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2. Related work
This section discusses some of the recent work on secure resource provenance in WSNs and IoT. In [17], a
detailed study and analysis of existing secure provenance schemes are presented. The study discusses the use
of provenance in WSNs and IoT, and also the importance of securing provenance. A detailed classification
of the existing secure provenance methods is presented, and the issues related to each of the techniques are
highlighted and discussed. A light-weight protocol for secure provenance in IoT using physical unclonable
functions is discussed in [18]. The technique highlights the need for proper authentication of data coming
from numerous connected low-cost sensors. Block chain is currently used to provide high security in data
transmission in various networks. A method to secure provenance in a cloud environment is discussed in [19].
The major advantage with the block chain-based methods is that it can provide tamper-proof records and
enable the transparency of data accountability in the cloud network. The importance of providing secure data
provenance throughout the whole life-cycle of the IoT devices connected in the network is discussed in [20]. In
[21], various design requirements of data provenance in IoT are analyzed, and the existing issues are highlighted.
A method for ensuring security with provenance data using Bloom filter is discussed in [22]. This technique
was designed mainly for low-cost sensors with limited storage and computational capabilities. An interesting
technique for secure data provenance for data-intensive applications is proposed in [23]. The authors discussed
the importance of designing effective provenance management systems in these types of networks. A secure
provenance architecture with low overhead is proposed in [24]. This system is designed to react automatically
on detecting low trust between the nodes in the network. In [25], a technique for secure provenance in IoT
networks is discussed. Although many pieces of work have discussed secure provenance transmission and resource
sharing, most of them are complex and do not consider the energy level of various devices in the network. As
most of the connected devices include low-cost sensors, it is very vital to limit the energy usage and extend the
lifetime of devices in the network. To overcome these challenges, we propose an energy efficient and lightweight
security protocol for optimal resource provenance in wireless sensor networks. The next section discusses the
proposed technique in detail.
3. Proposed system
In this section, we present and discuss the proposed system for optimal resource provenance in multi-hop wireless
sensor networks. Initially, the designed system model is presented and discussed in detail. The theoretical
analysis of the proposed work is then discussed along with the algorithms for the generating and encoding of
CCC and for the detection of adversarial sensor nodes in multihop wireless sensor networks.
3.1. System model
Figure 1 presents the system model of the proposed security protocol. When two sensor nodes communicate,
there are various parameters like phaser information (PI), time of arrival (ToA), transmit power (TP), receive
power (RP), throughput, and error vector magnitude (EVM) that are considered for generating the cooperative
correlating coefficient (CCC) in the WSN network. The transmit and received signal strength (TRSS) has
a direct relation with the CCC. The value of TRSS is recorded in real-time using USRP. Depending on the
transmit and receive power, the value of TRSS can be varied to maintain the optimal power at the nodes.
For performing the simulation and experiment, the following four scenarios are considered: the sensor network
having no adversarial nodes, the sensor network having adversarial nodes between sensor node SN1 and SN2,
the resources shared and tampered at the sensor node, and the sensor nodes replaced by the adversarial node.
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The proposed solution validates the security in all the mentioned cases by consuming very little power. The
real-time values for the USRP nodes deployed in a sensor network is then calculated.
Cloud

CCC generated
by node 1
communicating
with node 2
CCC 12

Server
Node

CCC 23
CCC 21

CCC 32 CCC 13

CCC 31
CCC 12

Sensor
Node 1

Sensor
Node 2

SN
3

Bidirectional Link

Bidirectional Link
Sensor
Node 3

Figure 1. System model.

3.2. Theoretical analysis
3.2.1. Detection of adversarial node
Each sensor node in WSN and IoT networks records the CCC value every 10 s. The CCC values are in dBm
range. The power of the transmitted and received signal is calculated by using the Friis transmission equation.
Here Prec is the received power by the sensor node, Ptx is the transmitted power by the sensor node, and
Gat , Gar are the gain of the transmitted and receiving antenna respectively and LP th is the path loss during
transmission. The path loss is large, and the received power by sensor node is small; hence, CCC is also small.
(
)2
The path loss for transmission is given by LP th = 4πD
. Here ‘D’ is the distance between the sensor nodes
λ
and λ is the wavelength. The value of λ is 400 nm, and the operating frequency of USRP is 2.4 GHz. The
gain value is chosen as 60 to make the measured value positive. The quantization of CCC is done using the
word length of 16 bit and having 216 levels LB . The magnitude of measuring and dividing the optimal CCC
in Min and Max values and mapping it into ‘Z’ fragment. The magnitude has height ‘h’. This is represented as
h=

Prec(max) −Prec(min)
Z

. The Prec(max) and Prec(min) are the max and min value of the received power. Then,

the fragment centre is assigned the value from 0 to Z-1. The signal of the sample falling in the fragment is
round off to the centre value. Then, each fragment is crippled a word length of 16 bit ‘Ncc’. These 16 bit is the
CCC value. This CCC value is encoded with a 16-bit secret key. The secret key is SKN 1 for SN1, SKN 2 for
SN2, and SKN 3 for SN3. The encoded CCC is given by:
ENCCC[1→N ] = NCCC[1→N ] ⊕ ECCC SKN

(1)

Each sensor node maintains its own secret key and CCC without sharing it with other sensor nodes. The
server node is assumed to be highly secure and resource sharing is done only after authentications.
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3.2.2. Transmit/receive signal strength for SN and CCC analysis
The transmit and receive signal strength for the sensor node using CCC is presented in this section. The
transmit power is limited, and it has to be distributed by considering optimal CCC as the target represented as
CCCi and CCCj for the transmit node and the receiving node in the given architecture. The cooperation and
provenance of the transmit/receive nodes are utilized to address the mentioned problem. To satisfy the optimal
CCC target, the following condition for transmission power signal strength of ith and j th sensor nodes have to
be satisfied,
2
T RSSi = vi2 [f] ≥ (σw
/SN2ij )CCCi
2
T RSSj = vj2 [f] ≥ (σw
/SN2ij )CCCj

(2)

Initially we start with the power analysis of the transmit and receive nodes. Here the transmission power
signal strength for sensor node source ‘i’ in the occupied frequency spectrum ‘f’ is given as TRSSi [f]. The TRSS
power allocation at the ith sensor node is given by,
T RSSi [f1 ] =

∑

vi2 [f1 ]

(3)

We then analyze the power allocation for different frequency slots. The TRSS power allocation at
frequency slot f2 − f1 is given by,
T RSSi [f2 − f1 ] =

∑

2 2
[f2 − f1 ] (SNij
vj [f2 − f1 ] + σn2

(4)

The TRSS power allocation at source j for frequency slot (1 − f2 ) is given by:
T RSS [(1 − f2 )] =

∑

a2j [(1 − f2 )]

(5)

The TRSS power allocation at source j for frequency slot (1 − f1 ) is given by:
T RSSj [(1 − f1 )] =

∑

(
) 2
2 2
2
[(1 − f1 )] SNji
vj [(1 − f1 )] + σw
vj

(6)

The total TRSS transmission power for sensor node source i is represented as:
T RSSi =

∑

T RSSi [f1 ] + T RSSi [f2 − f1 ]

(7)

The optimal TRSS transmit power for sensor node source j is given as:
T RSSj =

∑

T RSSj [f1 − f2 ] + T RSSj [1 − f1 ]

(8)

The net TRSS transmit power of all sensor nodes are represented by:
T RSStotal = T RSSi + T RSSj

(9)

Now we aim at deriving the optimal criteria for “CCC” at all the sensor transmitting nodes in the system.
For this we can analyze the above equations and results. The CCC for the ith transmitter is represented as the
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ratio of signal strength allocated at a given spectrum for the j th source’s collaborative retransmission to the
signal strength of the original transmission of sensor node source j(i ̸= j). From eqs. 4 and 6, the cooperation
ratio for the ith sensor node is computed as:

[Ri ] = (T RSSi [f2 − f1 ])/(T RSSj [1 − f2 ]) = (a2i [f2 − f1 ](Ci j 2 vj2 [1 − f2 ] + σn2 ))/(vj2 [1 − f2 ])

(10)

for 0 ≤ Ri < ∞ and j ̸= i.
2
[Rj ] = (T RSSj [1 − f1 ])/(T RSSi [f1 ]) = (a2i [1 − f1 ](SNi j 2 vi2 [f1 ] + σw
))/(vj2 [f1 ])

(11)

for i, jϵ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and 0 ≤ Rj < ∞ and j ̸= i. The noncooperative condition points to: [Ri ] = [Rj ] = 0
3.2.3. Signal strength sharing at received SN and CCC analysis
The CCC of sensor node at the receiving side is to be calculated on the presumed condition that the receiving
sensor node optimally combine {rcij , rscij } to CCC. The mutual and random noises are considered exclusively
from the information of messages. Thus, it is concluded that the maximum CCC combining at the receiving
nodes optimize the CCC of rcij and rscij . The optimal CCC coefficients can be represented as:
2
2
(Γi [f2 − f1 ])/(Γi [f1 ]) = (Ci jvj [f2 − f1 ]σw
)/((σw
+ Ci j 2 vj2 [f2 − f1 ]σn2 ))

(12)

2
2
(Γi [1 − f2 ])/(Γi [1 − f1 ]) = (Ci jvi [1 − f2 ]σw
)/((σw
+ Ci j 2 vi2 [1 − f2 ]σn2 ))

(13)

The CCCs calculated with optimal compounding at the receiving sensor node can be represented as:

1
2
2
[CCCj = U(f
.(Ci j 2 vj2 [1 − f1 ])/(σw
) + (Ci j 2 vi2 [1 − f1 ]Ci j 2 vj2 [1 − f1 ])/(σw
+ Ci j 2 vi2 [1 − f2 ]σn2 )
1)

(14)

We now need to obtain the CCC of each transmitting senor node in the network. It is obtained by
substituting eqs. 10 and 11 into eqs. 14 and 15 and given by:

CCCi =

f2
2
∪
Cij
Pi [f2 − f1 ]
f1

CCCj =

2
σw

f2
2
∪
Cij
Pi [1 − f1 ]
1

2
σw

+

+

2
σw

2
σw

4
Rj Pi2 [f2 − f1 ] Cij
)
2 P [f ] + σ 2 + R P [f ] C 2 σ 2
Cij
i 1
i i 1
n
ij n

(15)

4
Rj Pi2 [1 − f1 ] Cij
)
2 P [f ] + σ 2 + R P [f ] C 2 σ 2
Cij
i 1
i i 1
n
ij n

(16)

(

(

The inference of CCC for ith and j th sensor node CCCi , CCCj and the cooperative ratios Ri , Rj between
them allow us to completely analyze the optimal transmission power at the sensor nodes for all different SN
nodes and the optimal collaboration among them.
3213

LAL and PRATHAP/Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci

3.2.4. Adversarial node replaces sensor node and sends the data to the server node:
Here, SKN 1 , SKN 2 , and SKN 3 are the secret keys shared with the server. The server node decodes all the
resources shared from different sensor nodes using the secret key associated with the representative sensor node.
NCCC[1→N ] = ENCCC[1→N ] ⊕ ςKN

(17)

The decoded value of CCC is converted to decimal value in dBm and the Pearson correlation coefficient
is performed to find optimal CCC value. If the value lies between 0.7 and 1, the CCC has high correlation and
if it is between 0 and 0.2 it has low correlation.
ζR1 R2 =

CON (R1 R2 )
σR1 σR2

(18)

The correlation coefficient ‘C’ is calculated as:
∏n
∏n
i=1 (R2 − R̂2 )
i=1 (R1 − R̂1 )
√
√
C=
∏n
∏n
2
2
i=1 (R1 − R̂1 )
i=1 (R2 − R̂2 )

(19)

where R1 and R2 are the CCC value of the resource shared at sensor node SN1 and SN2 and R̂1 and
R̂2 are the mean for the ‘N’ segment of resources. The correlation coefficient will have three values, where 1
if for perfect CCC, 0 is for no CCC and –1 for inverse CCC. The server node correlates the CCC value of the
neighboring sensor node. The absence of adversarial node in the sensor network indicates the high CCC value.
The intrusion of adversarial node between SN1 and SN2 interrupts the resource sharing and the CCC value
received at SN1 and SN2 will be different. The value of CCC will change depending on the level of intrusion.
The server node does the decoding with the secret key already shared by the sensor node.

Algorithm for the generating and encoding of CCC
1. Initialize j = 1 → n, k = 1 + number of nodes.
2. Initialize the sensor node and bidirectional transfer of resources
3. Received power Prec from neighbor is PrecCurrent [j] ← PrecCurrent [j] + G
4. Quantize the word length PrecCurrent [j] .
5. CCC[j] ← binary code assigned to quantized PrecCurrent [j] .
6. ENCCC [j] ← XOR (NCCC [j] , ζKN [k]) .
7. ENCCC copy at corresponding sensor node sent to server node.
Algorithm for detection of adversarial sensor node in the IoMT
1. ENCCC [j] ← XOR (ENCCC [j] , ζKN 1 [j]).
2. PrecCurrent [j] ← Bin − DecConv (NCCC [j])
3214
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3. NCCC [j] ← XOR (ENCCC [j] , ζKN 2 [j])
4. PrecCurrent [k] ← Bin − DecConv (NCCC [k]).
5. ζ (PrecCurrent [j] , PrecCurrent [k])
6. if [0.8 < ζ ≤ 1] , then
7. return adversarial node absent
8. else if ζ = –1 to 0.8, then
9. return adversarial node present
10. else return [Prec values are not shared properly
11. end if.
For the resource provenance, the header information is analyzed to reach the origin node for resources.
The header details are present in the server node as each sensor node copies the CCC at the server node.
The resource shared to node 2 from sensor node1 routed through sensor node 3, the CCC of the headers are
compared in the server in the sequence it is received. The last headers received from the sensor node are
compared, and it converges as origin node. The sensor node forms the header information using CCC and
forwards it to the neighboring sensor node. The neighboring sensor node receives and forwards by attaching
the header information using its CCC. The transmission converges to the end node where the end node adds
its own header and passes it to the server node. The server node has the information of the header attached by
different sensor nodes and its neighbor. To verify the origin node, server nodes decode the header information
with secret key and correlative CCC with the CCC already received by different nodes. The matching of the
CCC enables the same process repeated to the adjacent node, this continues till all the header information of
sensor nodes is exhausted, and high value for CCC is achieved. If a mismatch occurs in the CCC value, the
node corresponding to the sensor node for the CCC value will be the node where information is trans/received.
This process can help us in finding the links where exactly the information has been forged. Thus, secure and
optimal resource provenance is achieved.
4. Results and discussion
The proposed secure resource provenance sharing method is applied to the WSN and IoT network through
simulation in MATLAB 2018a. The results of the simulation are presented and discussed in this section. Figure
2 presents the transmit-receive amplitude of the signal and the transmit-receive power of the signal with varying
time when cooperative correlating coefficient (CCC) is not used. Here we can observe that the amplitude and
power of the signal for transmitting and receiving nodes is constant with varying time in normal scenarios.
Figure 3 presents the transmit-receive amplitude of the signal and the power of the signal with varying
time when CCC is used. It can be observed that the amplitude of the signal is maximum when the power
transmitted between the nodes is high. Here the sharing of the resources between the sensor nodes indicates
the strength of the mutual cooperation between the nodes, which will act as a link to generate the CCC.
Figure 4 presents the cooperative correlating coefficient and the transmit-receive power with varying time.
It is observed that, as the transmit-receive power is high, the cooperative correlating coefficient is also high.
The CCC is computed and matched at the source and destination sensor node, which is broadcasted to all the
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Signal amplitude (V)

S i gn al Ampl i t ud e (V)

connecting intermediate sensor nodes. Higher value of cooperative correlating coefficient indicates stronger and
secure resource sharing between the sensor nodes with optimal resource provenance. This scenario is without
the presence of any adversarial sensor node in the network. In Figure 5, we can observe that, in presence
of an adversarial node in the network, the amplitude and power do not have uniform variations; hence, the
cooperative correlating coefficient value will be less. Thus, using the proposed approach, we can attain optimal
resource provenance sharing between the nodes and also efficiently detect malicious nodes in the network.
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5. Conclusion
In WSN and IoT applications, security of resource sharing and provenance is a major area of concern where
the intruders can easily inject malicious intermediate nodes for various personal gains. In this paper, we
proposed a lightweight security protocol for optimal resource provenance in multihop WSN. The system model
and theoretical analysis were presented and discussed in detail. The newly proposed cooperative correlating
coefficient (CCC) value was used to determine the presence of adversarial sensor nodes between the hops in
the network. The real-time CCC values are derived from the cooperation of two USRP and the simulation for
the detection of adversarial sensor node and resource provenance was done using MATLAB. The experimental
result demonstrated secure resource provenance sharing in sensor network with high energy efficiency compared
to the existing techniques.
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